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Abstract
The rise of narratives of disinformation 
in the Iraqi public sphere is threatening 
to destabilise an already fragile politi-
cal system. Discourse and narratives are 
being manipulated by powerful elites 
who are banking on declining trust in 
the government and official institutions 
to aid the spread of false information. 
Alternative voices and opinions, from 
activists to journalists and human rights 
defenders, are also being targeted through 
metanarratives which serve to discredit 
their actions and intentions. In the spe-
cific context of Iraq, where mainstream 
media lack the capacity and will for ver-
ification, these narratives – emerging on 
social media platforms – are now inform-
ing media content and debates.
This paper examines the key narratives 
of disinformation that are prevalent in 
Iraqi media. It provides an analysis of the 
messages, agents, intentions and impact 
of the spread of disinformation. Focus-
ing particularly on the period during 
which planned national elections were 
postponed, it identifies narratives of dis-
information which emerged during that 
time. I argue that, due to the overriding 
partisan and unprofessional conditions 
for the media and the challenging polit-
ical context of Iraq, the lines between 
partisan information and disinformation 
have become blurred. 
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Executive Summary
The rise of narratives of disinformation in the Iraqi public sphere is threatening to destabi-
lise an already fragile political system. Discourse and narratives are being manipulated by 
powerful elites who are banking on declining trust in the government and official institu-
tions to aid the spread of false information. Alternative voices and opinions, from activists 
to journalists and human rights defenders, are also being targeted through metanarratives 
which serve to discredit their actions and intentions. In the specific context of Iraq, where 
mainstream media lack the capacity and will for verification, these narratives which are 
emerging on social media platforms are now informing media content and debates. 
This paper will examine the key narratives of disinformation that are prevalent in Iraqi 
media. It will provide an analysis of the messages, agents, intentions and impact of the 
spread of disinformation. It will then focus particularly on the period during which planned 
national elections were postponed in order to identify narratives of disinformation which 
may have emerged during that time. It will argue that, due to the overriding partisan and 
unprofessional conditions for the media and the challenging political context of Iraq, the 
lines between partisan information and disinformation have become blurred.
Based on these findings, this paper makes the following recommendations:
Monitor and fact-check Iraq’s information space. This should be conducted in the 
lead up to future Iraqi elections, local and national. This would not only highlight 
election-related disinformation but help to improve media standards in general. Proj-
ects such as the Stanford Election Partnership monitored mis- and disinformation in 
the US 2020 election, aiming to combat the spread of false narratives by sharing their 
findings with technology giants, media and policy-makers in real time. 
Crack down on disinformation. Technology giants have a role to play in limiting 
disinformation by monitoring accounts which violate their platforms’ policies. Gov-
ernment bodies, civil society organisations and the media should continue to engage 
Facebook, Twitter and Telegram and encourage them to fight disinformation. This 
approach has shown some success in the fight against COVID-19 mis-and disinfor-
mation as well as during the fight with the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). 
Support the growth and development of independent media. Without a more 
developed media landscape in Iraq, accountable to professional standards and the 
public, ethical practices regarding verification and accuracy will not be addressed. 
Wider media development interventions that focus on sourcing independent revenue 
streams, capacity-building for journalists and better governance structures in media 
houses are necessary for a long-term solution. 
Co-ordinate with international initiatives. There are a number of global projects 
to combat disinformation. United efforts to combat disinformation on a wider basis 
will support efforts at the national level in Iraq. Iraqi stakeholders should engage with 
these projects – for example the United Nations ‘Verified’ initiative and organisations 
such as the Global Investigative Journalists Network and First Draft News – in order to 
ensure that the needs of Iraq are considered in emerging solutions. 
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الملخص التنفيذي 
تهدد الزيادة يف رسديات املعلومات املضللة يف املجال العام العراقي بزعزعة استقرار النظام السيايس الهش أصالً. يتم 
التالعب بالخطاب والرسد من قبل النخب القوية التي تعتمد عىل تراجع الثقة يف الحكومة واملؤسسات الرسمية للمساعدة 
يف نرش املعلومات الزائفة. يتم أيضاً استهداف األصوات واآلراء البديلة، من النشطاء إىل الصحفيني واملدافعني عن حقوق 
اإلنسان، من خالل رسديات كربى تعمل عىل تشويه أفعالهم ونواياهم. يف السياق الخاص بالعراق، حيث تفتقر وسائل 
اإلعالم السائدة إىل القدرة واإلرادة عىل التحقق، فإن هذه الرسديات التي تظهر عىل منصات وسائل التواصل االجتامعي 
تعمل اآلن عىل صوغ املحتوى اإلعالمي واملناقشات.
ستدرس هذه الورقة الرسديات الرئيسية للمعلومات املضللة السائدة يف وسائل اإلعالم العراقية. وستقدم تحليالً للرسائل 
تأجيل  تم خاللها  التي  الفرتة  بشكل خاص عىل  ذلك  بعد  املضللة. وسرتكز  املعلومات  انتشار  وتأثري  والنوايا  والعوامل 
الفرتة.  التي قد تكون ظهرت خالل تلك  الوطنية املخطط لها من أجل تحديد رسديات املعلومات املضللة  اإلنتخابات 
العراق،  الصعب يف  السيايس  والسياق  االعالم  لوسائل  املهنية  والظروف غري  التحيز  بسبب هيمنة  أنه  الورقة  ستجادل 
أصبحت الخطوط الفاصلة بني املعلومات املتحيزة واملعلومات املضللة غري واضحة.
بناًء عىل هذه النتائج ، تقدم هذه الورقة التوصيات التالية:
اإلنتخابات  تسبق  التي  الفرتة  يف  ذلك  يتم  أن  يجب  العراقي.  املعلومايت  الفضاء  يف  الحقائق  وتحري  مراقبة 
العراقية يف أكتوبر/ترشين األول 2021، إن تم امليض قدماً يف االنتخابات. هذا  لن يسلط الضوء عىل املعلومات 
املضللة املتعلقة باالنتخابات فحسب، بل سيساعد عىل تحسني معايري اإلعالم بشكل عام. رصدت مشاريع مثل 
Stanford Election Partnership املعلومات الخاطئة واملضللة يف إنتخابات الواليات املتحدة األمريكية 2020، 
التكنولوجيا  عاملقة  مع  اليها  توصلت  التي  النتائج  مبشاركة  قامت  الكاذبة  الروايات  إنتشار  مكافحة  وبهدف 
ووسائل اإلعالم وصانعي السياسات بشكل فوري.
مراقبة  خالل  من  املضللة  املعلومات  من  الحد  يف  دوراً  التكنولوجيا  عاملقة  يلعب  املضللة.  املعلومات  مكافحة 
الحسابات التي تنتهك سياسات منصاتهم. يجب عىل الهيئات الحكومية ومنظامت املجتمع املدين ووسائل اإلعالم 
الدأب يف التواصل مع فيسبوك وتويرت وتيلغرام وتشجيعهم عىل مكافحة املعلومات املضللة. أظهر هذا النهج بعض 
النجاح يف الحرب ضد املعلومات املضللة والخاطئة عن COVID-19 وكذلك أثناء محاربة تنظيم الدولة اإلسالمية 
يف العراق والشام )داعش(.
العراق، وخاضع للمساءلة أمام  دعم توسع وتطور وسائل اإلعالم املستقلة. فبدون مشهد إعالمي أكرث تطوراً يف 
املعايري املهنية والجمهور، لن يتم التعامل مع املامرسات األخالقية املتعلقة بالتحقق والدقة. تعد تدخالت تطوير 
وسائل اإلعالم األوسع نطاقاً والتي تركز عىل توفري مصادر دخل مستقلة وبناء قدرات الصحفيني وأنظمة حوكمة 
أفضل يف دور اإلعالم، رضورية لحل طويل األمد.
الجهود  ستدعم  املضللة.  املعلومات  ملكافحة  العاملية  املشاريع  من  عدد  هناك  الدولية.  املبادرات  مع  التنسيق 
يجب  العراق.  يف  الوطني  املستوى  عىل  املبذولة  الجهود  أوسع  نطاق  عىل  املضللة  املعلومات  ملكافحة  املوحدة 
 »Verified« املتحدة  األمم  مبادرة  املثال  سبيل  – عىل  املشاريع  هذه  العراقيون يف  املصلحة  أصحاب  يشارك  أن 
واملنظامت مثل شبكة الصحفيني االستقصائيني العاملية و First Draft News – من أجل ضامن أن تؤخذ احتياجات 
العراق يف اإلعتبار يف الحلول املستجدة.
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Introduction
On Sunday 14 March 2021, the Secretary General of the paramilitary group Asaʾib Ahl 
al-Haq (AAH), Qais al-Khazali, tweeted that he had received reliable information, without 
naming sources, that the Iraqi National Intelligence Service had moved 300 troops to its 
border on the orders of the UAE during a reported Emirati visit to the country.1 In his 
tweet, Khazali described the situation as an anti-Iraqi conspiracy saying, ‘Has Iraq reached 
a new level of weakness?’. The tweet was liked by nearly 3,000 people and shared by 1,000 
people with 1,500 comments. On Monday 15 March, the Iraqi National Intelligence Service 
refuted the claims in a statement calling the claims ‘harmful’ and expressing regret that 
it needed to respond to such false claims. An MP from the Sadiqoun political bloc, the 
political wing of AAH, Hassan Salem, then demanded that Parliament question Prime 
Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi, former head of the National Intelligence Service, about the 
claim. Later that day, a lesser-known armed group, Ashab al-Kahf, posted a statement on 
their Telegram account which denounced the PM for his actions and threatened to inten-
sify military action against foreign targets in Iraq. That night, Balad Air Base in Salahaddin 
province, which houses US forces, was hit by seven rockets according to local media. 
By Wednesday, Iraqi mainstream media platforms were covering the story. Al Ahad TV 
channel, affiliated with AAH, carried an interview with Kazem al-Sayadi, MP with the State 
of Law Coalition, who claimed that the UAE together with the US and Israel had plans to 
‘destabilise’ Iraq. 
Unverified claims such as this have become commonplace in Iraq and are increasingly 
threatening political processes and prospects for stability. The Iraqi public sphere is 
known less for its spaces for tolerant dialogue and debate, and more for its propensity to 
incite violence, threats and harassment. Social media accounts of politicians and influ-
encers are ubiquitous and popular amongst citizens with the lack of any gatekeepers of 
content lessening any chance of ‘factual accountability.’2 The mainstream media land-
scape in Iraq is funded by actors with entrenched political agendas and aspirations for 
power and they have become the main disseminators of false news and information from 
social media in a bid to engage with audiences who are moving away from mainstream 
media consumption. Such dissemination is increasingly marked by overtly violent inten-
tions to undermine the credibility of political actors and those who desire genuine change 
in Iraq’s political status quo.
In October 2019, a national protest movement that began in 2011 became more unified 
with greater clarity in its demands. Ongoing protests increased significantly in numbers 
and demands for an end to corruption and fair political representation became more 
coherent, despite being met by violence from security services and armed groups. A 
principal demand of the protesters was the overhaul of the muhasasa taʾifia system, the 
political quota-based system created in 2003 which allocates governance of public insti-
1   Qais al-Khazali, Tweet, 14 March 2021. Available at: https://twitter.com/Qais_alkhazali/
status/1371152851809013763 (accessed 10 August 2021). 
2   Lucas Graves & Chris Wells, ‘From Information Availability to Factual Accountability’, in James E. Katz 
& Kate K. Mays (eds), Journalism and Truth in an Age of Social Media (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2019), pp. 39–57.
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tutions and bodies on a sectarian basis. This system is considered to be one of the main 
causes behind the structural corruption associated with the Iraqi state and government. 
Adel Abdul Mahdi was eventually forced to resign as prime minister, to be replaced by the 
current PM al-Kadhimi. His appointment was, in part at least, intended to address some of 
the protestors’ demands, which included holding fair and transparent national elections 
ahead of schedule in June 2021. 
The protest movement, key activists within it and the al-Kadhimi government have all 
been subjected to campaigns of online harassment. These mainly consist of disinforma-
tion, which is spread as means of discrediting their statuses, once again undermining 
possibilities for meaningful change in Iraq. This report will examine the key narratives of 
disinformation in the Iraqi media, identifying some of the agents and motives behind the 
dissemination of those narratives. It will argue that competing narratives are being used 
by different rivals for power in Iraq as a means of silencing dissenting voices – activists 
and policy makers – in a bid to maintain the current system and limit the possibility for 
peaceful transition and change. However, it will show that in some situations, in this case 
the postponement of the national elections, there is a lack of clarity between information, 
used by political actors to contest the actions and motivations of their opponents, and 
disinformation. The unethical media environment is aggravating this situation further. 
What is Disinformation?
Disinformation is a relatively new concept and as such a universally agreed definition 
is hard to come by. The Russian term Dezinformatsiya referred to a unit within the KGB 
whose purpose was to mislead opponents and shape public perceptions.3 This word was 
then used in English during the Cold War in the 1980s to refer to Soviet attempts to gain 
influence by inserting misleading content in both Soviet and foreign media. By this point, 
networks of journalists were being employed by the Soviet Union to spread fabricated 
media content to discredit the United States.4 Tactics ranged from publishing forgeries of 
official documents to using targeted fake stories which suited specific political contexts. 
Although political disinformation is therefore not a new phenomenon, the modalities 
and forms that it takes have shifted. Research has also shown that false information is 
more likely to be spread on social media platforms, especially regarding political news.5 
The increasing use of social media has seen disinformation become more prolific given 
the increased speed and spread that digital platforms allow. Social media manipulation 
is now being used not only by authoritarian regimes and terrorist organisations but also 
mainstream political parties, in some cases to ‘suppress human rights, discredit political 
3   Aristedes Mahairas & Mikhail Dvilyanski, ‘Disinformation – Дезинформация (Dezinformatsiya)’, 
The Cyber Defense Review 3/3, (2018), pp. 21–28.
4   Nicholas J. Cull, Vasily Gatov, Peter Pomerantsev, Anne Applebaum & Alistair Shawcross, ‘Soviet Sub-
version, Disinformation and Propaganda: How the West Fought Against it’, LSE Institute of Global Affairs, 
October 2017. Available at: https://www.lse.ac.uk/iga/assets/documents/arena/2018/Jigsaw-Soviet-Sub-
version-Disinformation-and-Propaganda-Final-Report.pdf (accessed 10 August 2021).
5   Sara Brown, ‘MIT Sloan research about social media, misinformation and elections’, MIT Management 
Sloan School, 5 October 2020. Available at: https://mitsloan.mit.edu/ideas-made-to-matter/mit-sloan-re-
search-about-social-media-misinformation-and-elections (accessed 10 August 2021).
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opponents, and drown out dissenting opinions’.6 Trolls and troll farms, bots and cyber 
warfare are all different tactics that being used by political actors to this end.7
Communications scholars and media policy makers differ in their use of terminology to 
describe this growing phenomenon. ‘Online misinformation’ and ‘disinfodemic’ have 
become synonymous terms that are used interchangeably, the latter most recently during 
the COVID-19 pandemic. Similarly, ‘computational propaganda’, or ‘the use of algorithms, 
automation, and big data to shape public life’, is also considered a form of disinformation.8 
UNESCO differentiates between disinformation, mal-information and misinformation 
although it acknowledges that all are ‘orchestrated campaigns (to) spread untruths.’9 They 
refer to the ‘Information Disorder’ glossary by the Shorenstein Centre which defines dis-
information as
false information that is deliberately created or disseminated with the express 
purpose to cause harm. Producers of disinformation typically have political, fi-
nancial, psychological, or social motivations.10 
Disinformation’s key attribute is the fabrication of information with the intention to do 
harm. Misinformation lacks such malicious intent and mal-information entails the delib-
erate use of information which in itself is not necessarily false to cause harm, for example 
through leaks and hate speech. 
Scope and Objectives of the Research 
The Iraqi media is no stranger to disinformation narratives, having been a battleground 
between opposing factions for many years, driven by the political economy and dynam-
ics of media capture. Declining trust in the political system and government have also 
allowed for narratives to spread more rapidly across social media, the platform of choice 
as citizens turn away from legacy media they see as partisan.11 Iraq’s conflict-driven polit-
ical arena sees peripheral centres of power competing with each other in a number of 
ways, including in the public sphere.12 
6   Samantha Bradshaw & Philip N. Howard,’The Global Disinformation Order’, Computational Propoa-
ganda Research Project, University of Oxford, 2019. Available at: https://demtech.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/
uploads/sites/93/2019/09/CyberTroop-Report19.pdf (accessed 10 August 2021). 
7   Bensoula Noureddine, ‘Electronic Flies and Public Opinion’, Journal of Sociological and Historical 
Studies 11/1 (2020), pp. 195–211.
8   Ibid.
9   Claire Wardle & Hossein Derakhshan, ‘Thinking about “information disorder”: Formats of misinfor-
mation, disinformation and mal-information’, Journalism, ‘Fake News’ & Disinformation. Available at: 
https://en.unesco.org/sites/default/files/f._jfnd_handbook_module_2.pdf (accessed 10 August 2021). 
10   Claire Wardle, ‘Information Disorder: the Essential Glossary’, 2018. Available at: https://firstdraftnews.
org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/infoDisorder_glossary.pdf?x25702 (accessed 10 August 2021).
11   Aida Al-Kaisy, ‘A Fragmented Landscape: Barriers to Independent Media in Iraq’, LSE Middle East 
Centre Report, June 2019. Available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/100991/ (accessed 10 August 2021).
12   Mac Skelton & Zmkan A. Saleem, ‘Iraq’s Political Marketplace at the Subnational Level: The Struggle 
for Power in Three Provinces’, LSE Conflict Research Programme, 2020. Available at: http://eprints.lse.
ac.uk/105184/3/Iraq_s_Political_Marketplace.pdf (accessed 10 August 2021).
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This research seeks to examine some of the key disinformation narratives that emerged 
in Iraq in 2020 and early 2021. Using discourse analysis, it focuses specifically on the 
disinformation narratives appearing in the mainstream media, looking at their genesis 
and different iterations. This paper had originally intended to identify disinformation nar-
ratives that emerged around the national elections which were planned for June 2021. 
Historically, elections in Iraq have been hotly contested and attempts to discredit politi-
cal opponents have been rife. This invites examination of the extent to which the growth 
of explicit disinformation narratives serves to exacerbate an already politically volatile 
discursive environment. This focus was chosen because in any legitimate democracy 
citizens require accurate and transparent information during election periods to enable 
them to engage with political processes and make informed choices about electoral can-
didates. The media has an evident role to play in this process. In January 2021, however, 
the national elections were postponed until October 2021. The focus of this period of the 
analysis therefore shifted to examine narratives of disinformation that may have emerged 
around the decision to postpone the election. 
Method
Discourse analysis was carried out on media content in the weeks beginning 18 and 25 
January 2021 to examine the media narratives that were emerging around the decision to 
postpone national elections. In order to assess the mainstream media’s role in dissemi-
nating disinformation at this time, the study focused on news and political programming 
that reported on the postponement. News agency websites (al-Sumariya, al-Waa, Mawa-
zeen, Nas News), television channels (al-Furat, al-Iraqiya, al-Itijah, Dijla) and the websites 
of newspapers (al-Bayna al-Jadida, al-Mushriq, al-Sabah) were selected for this study. 
The platforms were chosen to reflect a range of political perspectives as well as for their 
popularity with Iraqi audiences. This is particularly relevant with regard to the television 
channels chosen because they are not only the most consumed form of media output but, 
arguably, also the most overtly politically partisan.13 In total, 155 pieces of content were 
analysed for this study. 
This discourse analysis was supplemented with interviews with 6 media practitioners and 
policy makers to validate and confirm findings. This also allowed the researcher to ensure 
that the analysis related to the socio-political context in Iraq of the time. Understanding 
of and reference to context remains key in any research undertaking, and in particular one 
involving discourse analysis, where it is important to consider the wider context within 
which the discourse is taking place. 
13   Al-Furat is owned by Ammar al-Hakim, former president of the Islamic Supreme Council, and leader 
of the National Wisdom Party; al-Iraqiya is the government-funded public broadcasting channel; al-Iti-
jah is owned by Kataʾib Hezbollah (KH); Dijla is owned by Jamal al-Karbouli, an Iraqi politician who 
heads the National Movement for Development and Reform party (al-Hal).
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A History of Disinformation in Iraq
Disinformation is not a new phenomenon in Iraq. Under Saddam Hussein’s Baathist 
regime, the media was used by the government as a tool for propaganda, with distortions 
of the truth and outright lies commonplace.14 After the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Coa-
lition Provision Authority (CPA) and occupying US forces also used media as a means of 
mobilising support for their activities and presence in Iraq and the region. This ranged 
from leaflet drops to the creation of a new television channel, al-Hurra Iraq, by Voice 
of America (VOA). These platforms were used to advance the political ideologies of the 
US government and challenged local Iraqi narratives. Since then, both al-Qaeda and ISIL 
have used the media for the propagation and dissemination of extremist ideologies as well 
as instilling fear in areas that remained under their control. Although there are some dis-
tinguishing features between propaganda and disinformation, the former playing more on 
the emotional or ‘non-rational’,15 the seeds were certainly planted for the misuse of media 
by elites and control of narratives to suit those in power. 
Since 2003, the Iraqi media have been driven by a multitude of different actors with very 
specific motivations and political agendas. Lack of access to independent financing has 
seen them rely on funding from political actors and, more recently, paramilitary groups 
and external governments with geopolitical interests in Iraq.16 Both state and non-state 
actors have relied on the media they finance to disseminate disinformation on their 
behalf, with little oversight from media regulatory bodies or watchdogs to ensure that 
standards of accuracy and transparency are properly observed. The Iraqi government and 
associated actors co-opted the media, in particular during the ethno-sectarian war from 
2005, to embellish the partisan narratives that dominated the political and information 
spheres. This eventually gave credence to the legitimatisation of militias and sub-state 
actors at both a state and societal level. 
In the 2018 national election in Iraq, a trend for ‘deep fakes’, or synthetically-generated 
videos, emerged in order to discredit candidates, particularly women, and discourage 
them from standing for election. Dr Intidhar Jassim, standing with the Victory Alliance of 
former PM Haider al-Abadi, was forced to withdraw her candidacy when a fake sex tape 
was circulated online.17 Dr Jassim was vociferous in accusing members of opposing parties 
of creating the tape. 
Increased access to digital platforms and social media has seen Iraqis subjected to the 
dissemination of propaganda and false content. ‘Electronic flies’ is a term used to describe 
false social media accounts, operated either by people or by bots, which adopt online 
trolling methods to disseminate political messages. Examples in Iraq include online troll-
ing by pro-Iranian and, to a lesser extent, Saudi Arabian electronic armies to support their 
14   Benjamin Isakhan, ‘Manufacturing Consent in Iraq: Interference in the post-Saddam Media Sector’, 
International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies 3/1 (May 2009), pp. 7–26. 
15  Dean Jackson, ‘Issue Brief: Distinguishing Disinformation From Propaganda, Misinformation, And 
“Fake News”’, National Endowment for Democray, June 2018. Available at: https://www.ned.org/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2018/06/Distinguishing-Disinformation-from-Propaganda.pdf (accessed 10 August 2021).
16   Al-Kaisy, ‘A Fragmented Landscape’.
17   Naseem Tarawneh, ‘Sextortion, harassment, and deepfakes: How digital weapons are being used 
to silence women’, IFEX, 5 March 2020. Available at: https://ifex.org/sextortion-harassment-and-
deepfakes-how-digital-weapons-are-being-used-to-silence-women/ (accessed 10 August 2021). 
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competing geo-political narratives. A series of investigations in June 2020 by Iraqi jour-
nalist Suadad Al-Salhy and The Telegraph reporter Wil Crisp found that political groups 
in Iraq were paying Facebook millions of dollars to drive traffic towards disinformation 
content. The report found that networks of fake accounts and pages had been created, 
claiming to be those of Iraqi politicians and in some cases even media organisations. 
Some of the largest networks were being funded by paramilitary groups such as Kataʾib 
Hezbollah, a member of the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMFs), or hashd al-shaʿabi, an 
officially sanctioned network of paramilitary groups that were institutionalised by former 
PM Nouri al-Maliki in 2014 to fight against ISIL.18 Further investigative work has also indi-
cated that the Lebanese militant organisation Hezbollah was training operatives in Iraq in 
online disinformation tactics.19 
Disinformation in the Iraqi Media in 2020
Research shows that public audiences are more likely to associate disinformation with the 
bias of a mainstream media platform than with social media.20 In the many cases where 
mainstream media are addressing disinformation in attempts to debunk it, the disinfor-
mation  becomes news, which effectively serves to further disseminate it.21 In the case of 
Iraq, audiences have grown accustomed to a plethora of fake news and content as well the 
use of mainstream media for propaganda purposes. Consequently, they are turning away 
from mainstream platforms to social media for their news and here the playing field is 
even more contested.22 
The killing of General Qasem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis at Baghdad Airport 
by a US drone strike in January 2020, combined with continuing anti-establishment pro-
tests and the COVID-19 pandemic led to a number of distinct disinformation narratives 
and trends emerging on Iraqi social media throughout the year. These were then per-
petuated by the mainstream media. Research on media consumption in Iraq has shown 
that there is widespread news fatigue amongst Iraqi audiences. They are also aware of 
the increase in disinformation narratives, particularly during the coronavirus pandemic, 
further embedding fear and mistrust of official institutions and media platforms.23 
18   Suadad Al Salhi & Wil Crisp, ‘Iraqi groups paying facebook millions to churn fake news’, Telegraph 
Online, 15 June 2020. Available at: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2020/06/14/iraqi-groups-pay-
ing-facebook-millions-churn-fake-news/ (accessed 10 August 2021).
19   Suadad Al Salhi & Wil Crisp, ‘Exclusive: Inside Hezbollah’s fake news training camps’, Telegraph 
Online, 2 August 2020. Available at: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2020/08/02/exclusive-inside-
hezbollahs-fake-news-training-camps-sowing/ (accessed 10 August 2021).
20   Ahmed Al Rawi, ‘Gatekeeping Fake News Discourses on Mainstream Media versus Social Media’, 
Social Science Computer Review 37/6 (2018), pp. 687–704. 
21   Yariv Tsfati, Hajo G. Boomgaarden, Jesper Strömbäck, Rens Vliegenthart, Alyt Damstra & Elina Lind-
gren, ‘Causes and Consequences of Mainstream Media Dissemination of Fake News: Literature review 
and synthesis’, Annals of the International Communication Association 44/2 (2020), pp. 157–73.
22   ‘How do Iraqi consume media and what implications does this have?’, BBC Media Action, 2019. 
Available at: http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/mediaaction/pdf/research-summaries/iraq-media-consump-
tion-jan2019.pdf (accessed 10 August 2021). 
23   ‘Fake News in Iraq’, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 2020. Available at: https://iwpr.net/glob-
al-voices/fake-news-iraq (accessed 10 August 2021).
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Targeting Activists and Journalists
Threats and the harassment of journalists and activists in Iraq remain endemic and per-
vasive, both in the physical and online spheres. These often begin with allegations and 
content falsely associating them with parties often considered to be enemies of Iraq, 
namely the United States or the Gulf countries. One of the most high-profile of these 
cases took place in September 2019, when messages began circulating on Iraqi social 
media accusing twelve journalists and human rights defenders of ‘wanting to normalise 
relations with Israel’. Some have suggested that these claims were issued as a death threat 
to the journalists. One of those targeted, Ali Wajeeh, wrote a letter to the prime minister 
asking if there was a ‘directive’ from government calling for the death of the journalists.24 
There has also been a rise in disinformation about the protest movement in order to 
undermine the protestors and their demands. Accusations levelled include receiving 
support and funding from the US as well as being against Islamic values. Because some of 
the October 2019 revolutionaries had dressed up as the main character from the film, The 
Joker, the term jokeriya was adopted to refer to the protest movement. The term has since 
been employed by politicians and media in order to both belittle the protestors and asso-
ciate them with foreign interests, implying that jokeriya are those supporting the agendas 
of the US and Israel. This smear has indelibly put the lives of activists in danger as a result. 
This has been seen on a number of channels associated with the PMF such as al-Afaq, 
al-Ahad and al-Itijah. Al-Afaq, affiliated with former PM Nouri al-Maliki, ran a news report 
on 10 January using the term jokeriya, which accused foreign forces of falsifying news 
regarding the protest movement.25 Keen to promote the view that the protest movement 
was declining and increasingly ineffective, the PMF-affiliated outlets accused channels 
such as the US-funded al-Hurra and the Saudi-funded Saud Channel of using old footage 
from October 2019 to show that the protest movement was still active. 
On 11 January 2011, a programme broadcast on UTV included an interview with a spokes-
person from AAH, Abdul Amir Taiban, who claimed that protestors in Al-Haboubi Square 
in Nasiriyah were being supported by Saudi Arabia, the Gulf and America. An activist who 
also appeared on the programme challenged him, saying he was putting lives in danger 
with his falsehoods and hate speech which would lead to further violence and killings. 
It should be noted that accusations of foreign funding have been used to incite violence 
against protestors more broadly, although this tends to be apparent on social media chan-
nels rather than traditional media platforms. For example, in a tweet on 8 February 2020, 
Muqtada al-Sadr called on protestors to abandon their foreign backers,26 inciting violence 
against them if they ignored his threats. A similar Twitter statement from Kataʾib Hez-
bollah on 8 January 2020 included threats upon the lives of protestors who continue to 
receive support from the US. In both of these instances, the disinformation narrative was 
24   ‘Dozens of Iraqi journalists blacklisted on social networks’, Reporters Sans Frontieres, 2019. Available at: 
https://rsf.org/en/news/dozens-iraqi-journalists-blacklisted-social-networks (accessed 10 August 2021).
25   ‘News bulletin’, Al Afaq. 10 January 2020. 
26   Muqtada al-Sadr, Tweet, 8 February 2020. Available at https://twitter.com/Mu_AlSadr/
status/1226119773836238848 (accessed 11 August 2021). 
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not only reinforced but weaponised.27 In August 2020, activist Riham Yacoub was shot 
dead in Basra after a fake video circulated on social media showed her leading demonstra-
tions and chants on the street, accompanied by rumours that she was acting as a US agent 
fomenting violent unrest in the city.28
Another common narrative used to discredit the movement is to accuse protestors of pro-
moting homosexuality, drug and alcohol consumption as well as prostitution, positioning 
them as against Islamic values and society. When social media activist and regular protes-
tor Safa al-Saraay was killed on 28 October 2019 after being shot in the head by a tear gas 
cannister, narratives which painted him as anti-religious and morally corrupt were rife on 
social media. This has led to the waning of public sympathy with the protestors in some 
instances, with attacks against them increasingly legitimised among some.
Such disinformation strategies are being fuelled by the government-sanctioned PMF 
network and related armed groups as well as government security services and officials. 
Renad Mansour argues that the PMF ‘enjoys a symbiotic relationship with Iraq’s security 
services, political parties and economy’ and are afforded state power by being assimi-
lated into the Iraqi political system.29 The PMF’s strong connections to the ‘network of 
power’ that Mansour describes as the Iraqi state mean that they have a vested interest 
in maintaining the current political system. So as to protect it, they are explicitly using 
disinformation techniques to intimidate and silence voices critical of the political system.
Foreign Interests in Iraq
In January 2020, after Iran carried out ballistic missile attacks on US military bases in Iraq 
in retaliation for the killing of Soleimani, cheaply made ‘deep fake’ videos of the attacks 
circulated across social media. Social media actors used footage from rocket attacks in 
Ukraine and Palestine, for example, to stoke fear of Iranian reprisals locally and interna-
tionally. In some cases, the videos themselves were not manipulated but were posted with 
the deliberate intention of spreading false information and rumours simply by attributing 
them to Iran. 
There has also been an increase in the numbers of misleading videos circulating on social 
media related to attacks on US bases and convoys in Iraq. Events in some of the videos are 
falsely attributed while others give an exaggerated impression of the scale of the attacks. 
Groups within the PMF set up fake social media accounts of non-existent paramilitary 
groups which claim responsibility for the attacks. Such groups surface using online proc-
lamations on social media to claim responsibility only to subsequently disappear. One 
example was a group dubbing themselves al-Shaab al-Kahf, who claimed responsibility for 
a rocket attack on the US embassy in Baghdad in November 2020.
27   Feras Kilani, Tweet, 8 January 2020. Available at: https://twitter.com/FerasKilaniBBC/
status/1214953144901423104 (accessed 11 August 2021). 
28   Benedict Robin-D’Cruz, ‘Why did they kill Riham Yacoub?’, LSE Middle East Centre Blog, 24 August 
2020. Available at: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2020/08/24/why-did-they-kill-riham-yacoub-the-mur-
der-of-a-civil-society-activist-in-basra/ (accessed 10 August 2021). 
29   Renad Mansour, ‘Networks of Power: The Popular Mobilization Forces and the state of Iraq’, Chatham 
House, 25 February 2021. Available at: https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2021-03/2021-
02-25-networks-of-power-mansour.pdf (accessed 10 August 2021).
16 Disinformation in Iraqi Media
Paramilitary groups continue to spread disinformation via social media, using fake 
accounts, claiming responsibility for attacks on US targets or forces that in fact never took 
place. Such accounts often express support for Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, a PMF leader who 
was killed alongside Qasem Soleimani. For example, a group going under the name of the 
‘Thaʾr al-Muhandis Brigade’ posted a clip on 22 May 2020 allegedly showing a Chinook 
helicopter being shot out of the sky. This has since been proven to be a fabrication. None-
theless, the post was then covered in a news bulletin on al-Alam TV, a mainstream media 
channel funded by Iran. There have also been suggestions that the Kataʾib Hezbollah 
paramilitary group was one of the militias behind the creation of these false accounts. 
Another example of the use of a disinformation narrative appeared in September 2020. In 
this case, social media posts circulated alleging the US embassy had been closed and the 
US ambassador had left for Erbil. The disinformation was subsequently uncritically cir-
culated by popular mainstream television channels such as Dijla, al-Arabiya, al-Sharqiya 
and al-Hadath.
COVID-19 
The COVID-19 pandemic provided a new context of uncertainity and anxiety in Iraq. 
Since its inception, there has been some evidence of rural and tribal communities, clearly 
influenced by disinformation, being less likely to visit hospitals when showing signs of 
illness because trust in the government and associated institutions, including medical, 
is at an all-time low. As a consequence, the state’s communication and narrative around 
the pandemic has been usurped by anti-establishment actors. False narratives that the 
government were using COVID-19 as an excuse to clampdown on the protest movement 
and free movement more generally or to delay public sector salary payments were dis-
seminated. Rumours that the virus was created by the US or, in some cases, that it was 
being used by ISIL to facilitate their return to Iraq were common. These narratives were 
all reinforced on television and on social media.
In late March 2020, a number of Iraqi media outlets reported that a local pharmaceutical 
company had found a cure for COVID-19. These reports came after the drug company 
Pioneer posted on Facebook that it was continuing to provide drugs that might be effec-
tive in treating the new coronavirus. The media then jumped on this post, misinterpreting 
it and spreading false claims. A similar story ran a week later regarding another pharma-
ceutical company Samaraa, despite both companies denying these reports. This type of 
disinformation becomes particularly harmful in a country where trust in the medical pro-
fession is already low and vaccine hesitancy is high.30 A report by the Vaccine Confidence 
Project at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine which tracked vaccine 
confidence globally found that one of the key threats to successful vaccine programe is 
the ‘rapid and global spread of minformation.’31 A recent report in Middle East Eye also 
30   Omar Dewachi, Mac Skelton, Vinh-Kim Nguyen, Fouad M. Fouad, Ghassan Abu Sitta, Zeina Maasri & 
Rita Giacaman, ‘Changing therapeutic geographies of the Iraqi and Syrian wars’, The Lancet, 2014. Avail-
able at: https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(13)62299-0/fulltext (accessed 
11 August 2021).
31    ‘Largest global vaccine confidence survey reveals hesitancy hotspots’, London School of Hygiene and 
Tropical Medicine, 2020. Available at: https://www.lshtm.ac.uk/newsevents/news/2020/largest-glob-
al-vaccine-confidence-survey-reveals-hesitancy-hotspots (accessed 11 August 2021). 
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suggested that the growth of disinformation around vaccines was ‘undermining attempts 
to halt the spread of the disease.’32
For example, on 2 April 2020, Reuters published an article which claimed that official figures 
on cases and deaths from the virus in Iraq were inaccurate and higher than that being 
reported in the Iraqi media.33 The report referenced three doctors, a representative from the 
Ministry of Health and an unnamed political figure – all anonymously as medical staff had 
been told not to speak to the media – who suggested that the numbers of cases were in the 
thousands rather than the hundreds, as claimed by the Iraqi government. The report alleged 
that the government was hiding accurate data from the Iraqi public, a claim which has been 
denied by the health ministry. In response, the Communications and Media Commission 
(CMC), Iraq’s media regulator, suspended Reuters’ licence to operate in Iraq for three 
months and fined them 25 million Iraqi dinars ($21,000).34 They accused the agency of 
risking public safety and jeopardising efforts to contain the pandemic. National and interna-
tional press freedom organisations protested this as a clampdown on freedom of expression 
and a blatant attempt to misinform the Iraqi public on the spread of the disease. The license 
was reissued two weeks later following an intervention by President Barham Salih. 
An interview broadcast on al-Sharqiya News on 17 July 2020 gave a platform to advisors to 
the Iraqi government task force for COVID-19 who claimed that Iraq would be receiving 
vaccines from China and the UAE by 1 September. This claim, which was untrue, was cir-
culated across media platforms and broadly believed by the Iraqi public. 
Fake Accounts
Fake social media accounts continue to proliferate, with many impersonating high-profile 
figures with the aim of extortion and blackmail. Examples include a fake profile claim-
ing to be that of Haidar al-Amiri, the head of the Badr Organisation which comprises a 
political party and a paramilitary group with the PMF. Other fake profiles were set up 
in the names of the Minister of Finance, Ali Allawi, and the Defence Minister Gomma 
Enad. Many of these accounts have also sent threats to activists and protestors and leaked 
official documents in order to threaten politicians. There have also been fake accounts 
created with the names and logos of both the Iraqi Central Bank and Iraqi Airways, the 
latter circulating false timetables. The unauthorised social media accounts associated 
with the Iraqi Central Bank have been spreading false claims about the availability of loans 
aimed at extorting the personal information of the staff of government ministries. 
Facebook claimed to have closed down 324 fake accounts in Iraq (and Tunisia) in May 
32   Alex MacDonald, ‘Covid-19: Iraq’s doctors struggle against vaccine fears as cases hit new highs’, Middle 
East Eye, 1 May 2021. Available at: https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/Iraq-doctors-struggle-Covid-19-
vaccine-fears (accessed 11 August 2021). 
33   ‘Iraq has confirmed thousands more Covid-19 cases than reported, medics say’, Reuters, 2020. Available 
at: https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-health-coronavirus-iraq/iraq-has-confirmed-thousands-more-
covid-19-cases-than-reported-medics-say-idUKKBN21K2H6 (accessed 11 August 2021).
34   ‘Iraqi regulator suspends Reuters license for 3 months over Covid-19 report’, Committee to Protect Jour-
nalists, 2020. Available at: https://cpj.org/2020/04/iraqi-regulator-suspends-reuters-license-for-3-mon/ 
(accessed 11 August 2021).
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2020 as part of their Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB) project report.35 One of 
the networks removed appeared to have been financed by the Kurdistan Regional Gov-
ernment (KRG). It is also worth noting that a Parliamentary committee has very recently 
been formed to investigate this growing trend. However, some Iraqi human rights defend-
ers and campaigners for freedom of expression question whether official concern about 
disinformation might be used to pass a controversial cybercrimes bill and other legis-
lation that would significantly curb wider civil liberties and free speech. Although the 
Iraqi Parliament dropped its proposed cybercrimes draft law in February 2021, there were 
a number of proposed constraints on online and social media usage and communica-
tions which were likely to have been used to silence dissenting voices. A new draft is yet 
to be submitted to Parliament and, as attacks on critical opinions are becoming more 
widespread and violent, both on and offline, there remain concerns that any proposed 
legislation will be used to further crackdown on freedom of expression.36
Anti-Government Sentiment, al-Kadhimi and the 2021 Iraqi Election 
We have examined examples of narratives and strategies that are clearly intended to dis-
seminate falsehoods. However, the role of disinformation narratives becomes considerably 
murkier in contexts where it is difficult to establish a demonstrably correct accurate narra-
tive to serve as a benchmark of truth or falsity. This can be illustrated through an examination 
of the media narratives that surrounded the postponement of the Iraqi national elections.
The Iraqi prime minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi was appointed primarily to deal with the 
pandemic and in an attempt to respond to protestors’ demands for early free and fair elec-
tions.37 Because of this narrow mandate, his selection initially attracted cross-party support. 
However, his subsequent attempts to deal with increasing violence against activists, missile 
attacks against foreign interests in Iraq, and the impunity of paramilitary groups were met 
with systemic resistance resulting a number of concerted campaigns to discredit him and 
his government. These have become more heightened in the wake of proposed national 
elections as political parties begin to compete for public confidence and votes. 
In July 2020, in what appears to have been a clear attempt to respond positively to the 
demands of the protest movement, al-Kadhimi announced that national elections would 
be held on 6 June 2021, a year in advance of the original schedule of May 2022. This deci-
sion attracted widespread public approval. Protestors had also called for reform of the 
electoral system in order to ensure fairer representation across Iraq, and ultimately a more 
inclusive election. Parliament passed a new electoral law, originally introduced under the 
auspices of former PM Abdul Mahdi, which was subsequently criticised for its failure to 
reduce the domination of certain parties in parliament thereby making fair representation 
35   ‘May 2020 Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour Report’, Facebook, 2020. Available at: https://about.
fb.com/news/2020/06/may-cib-report/ (accessed 11 August 2021).
36   Kristen Sibbald, ‘Iraq Parliament Suspends Draconian Cybercrimes Bill’, Human Rights Watch, 
2021. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/05/07/iraq-parliament-suspends-draconian-cyber-
crimes-bill (accessed 11 August 2021).
37   Marsin Alshamary, ‘Six months into his premiership, what has Mustafa al-Kadhimi done for Iraq?’, 
Brookings, 13 November 2020. Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/11/13/
six-months-into-his-premiership-what-has-mustafa-al-kadhimi-done-for-iraq/ (accessed 11 August 2021). 
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for political independents much less likely. The claimed deficiencies of the new law not-
withstanding, it did mandate a significant increase in the number of electoral districts and 
the implementation of new individual nomination procedures for political candidates, 
both of which would require significant logistical adjustments.
The new electoral law states that the date of the national election should be agreed by 
the Council of Ministers (COM) in coordination with the cross-party Independent High 
Electoral Commission (IHEC) and this should be followed by a Presidential decree. Par-
liament must be dissolved two months in advance of the election date. On 19 January 
2021, following days of speculation, a decision to postpone the elections was announced. 
A proposal to delay the elections had been submitted by IHEC which was then approved 
by the COM. According to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI), IHEC 
had indeed held a number of meetings with Iraqi leaders and policymakers explaining the 
need for more time to ensure that all logistic and legislative measures were met to ensure 
free and fair elections could take place. These measures include for example ‘register(ing) 
political alliances and candidates, to expand biometric registration, and to deploy UN 
international electoral expertise and international observers on the ground.’38
Countering the claim that the election was postponed for solely logistical and technical 
reasons, however, were a number of mainstream media narratives that claimed that in 
fact it was al-Kadhimi and his government, and not IHEC, who were the key proponents 
of postponement. In other words, the claimed logistical and technical reasons were false. 
One of the overriding narratives was that al-Kadhimi never really wanted early elections 
as, along with the other political blocs, he knew that early elections would not be in the 
interest of those currently in power. This narrative was often accompanied by a parti-
san political source inside parliament claiming that agreements were being made behind 
closed doors between various political parties to postpone elections once again until May 
2022, the original official date. For example, on 23 January 2021, Al Mushreq newspaper 
quoted the MP Kazem al-Sayadi, from the opposition State of Law Coalition, in an article 
titled ‘A new political agreement to delay parliamentary elections until 2022?’. This was 
followed by a similar claim made by Ghazanfar al-Battikh, the leader of another opposi-
tion parliamentary bloc, the Fatah Coalition, in an article from 24 January 2021. 
Another widespread narrative perpetuated across different media platforms (and news 
agency websites in particular) was that al-Kadhimi put pressure on IHEC to delay the 
elections for ostensibly technical reasons. This narrative was pushed predominantly by 
Muqtada al-Sadr and his Sairoon Alliance, who have consistently questioned the prime 
minister’s decisions regarding the elections. The news agency websites Mawazeen and the 
government funded al-Waa both referenced sources from Sairoon, including a tweet by 
Sadr himself on 18 January 2021, the day of the election postponement. This narrative was 
also reproduced in programming on the al-Itijah channel of Kataʾib Hezbollah, a paramil-
itary group within the PMF. 
38   ‘Iraq’s electorial preparations and processes report No 5.’, United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq 
(UNAMI), 2021. Available at: https://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/iraq-s-electoral-preparations-and-pro-
cesses-report-no-5 (accessed 11 August 2021). 
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Discourse analysis also revealed another narrative centred around the claim that the 
elections could no longer be considered early and therefore al-Kadhimi had not met the 
demands of the people. This narrative was clearly intended to undermine al-Kadhimi in 
the eyes of the protestors and public, and was prominent across the mainstream broadcast 
media’s coverage of the postponement decision. In these cases, it was mostly programme 
presenters who made these claims. In a political programme on the al-Itijah channel on 
19 January 2021, called the ‘Hour of Exposure: Al-Kadhimi’s government: No elections, 
no reforms, no budgets’, for example, the presenter Ali al-Zaidi interrupted his guests a 
number of times to repeat some of the anti-Kadhimi narratives outlined above. However, 
a programme which appeared on al-Furat channel on 25 January 2021, entitled ‘The elec-
tions are plagued by postponement. Will you give up?’, included MP Muhaned al-Atabi 
from the Nahj al-Watani party claiming that elections could only be classified as early if 
they were held within two years of the previous election. 
Politicians were the original sources of many of these competing and mostly unverifia-
ble media narratives clearly aimed at discrediting al-Kadhimi. Media outlets would then 
reference and include their comments from social media. This draws attention to the 
role that the mainstream media are playing in uncritically disseminating unverifiable and 
politically partisan narratives. It also points up a worrying trend in Iraq of social media 
content driving mainstream media narratives and informing media content. Whether this 
is a result of having to keep up with 24-hour news cycles or a quest to gain further audi-
ence share, it is clearly problematic when verification skills and professional ethics are 
low.39 It is also worth noting that the media’s overreliance on political experts as sources 
further exacerbates this situation. Broadcast media were actively encouraging highly ques-
tionable narratives, perhaps paradoxically through their questioning and choice of guests.
In contrast, the government-funded media platforms, such as the flagship television 
channel al-Iraqiya, al-Sabah newspaper and the al-Waa news agency largely ignored narra-
tives questioning the reasons behind the election postponement. This is hardly surprising 
given the close relationship between the public media platforms and the government. 
Senior management positions at al-Iraqiya are chosen by the government and the current 
Director General, Nabil Jassim, was directly appointed by al-Kadhimi in July 2020.  The 
question thus arises as to how the Iraqi public is to distinguish between narratives based 
on what can reasonably be described as accurate and verifiable information from those 
narratives clearly intended to disinform them?
39   Tsfati et. al., ‘Causes and Consequences of Mainstream Media Dissemination of Fake News’.
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Conclusion 
As this paper has shown, overt disinformation in the form of such things as fake social 
media accounts, ‘deep fakes’ and patently false media narrative has become endemic in 
Iraq. The use of disinformation in Iraq also serves, moreover, to remind us that it can be 
used by both those in power as well as their opponents. In many such cases the malicious 
intent of such narratives is readily apparent because it is relatively easily exposed through 
juxtaposition with evidently more plausible and verifiable narratives. In other words, there 
is bona fide information against which distorting claims and narratives can be judged. 
It is precisely because disinformation has become so ubiquitous that it also creates a 
context in which it becomes increasingly difficult to differentiate between the veracity of 
competing media narratives where the supposed truth of the matter is harder to discern, 
as in the case of the decision to postpone the Iraqi national election shows. The claim that 
the decision to postpone the elections was primarily based upon logistical and technical 
factors is given some plausibility by virtue of UNAMI’s seeming endorsement. However, 
for a host of widely acknowledged reasons, such as the increase in violence, the continuing 
lack of access to basic public services, coupled with the evident recourse to disinforma-
tion narratives by Iraqi governments and the media platforms they control when it has 
suited their purposes, it is understandable why the Iraqi public’s trust in the government 
has declined over the years. 
The main narratives challenging the government’s own account of the postponement 
decision clearly sought to draw upon the low level of public mistrust. They variously 
claimed that al-Kadhimi was manipulative, even fraudulent, and could not deliver an early 
election despite his stated commitment to the protestors and the Iraqi public. Highly 
partisan media serve only to exacerbate further the blurring of the line between informa-
tion and disinformation. What remains unanswered is whether or not logistical problems 
would have arisen if the elections had gone ahead as planned. All of the narratives can 
thus be seen as incomplete in the absence of unassailable evidence about the technical 
and logistic challenges or lack thereof arising as a consequence of changing the electoral 
date. On what basis then does the Iraqi public choose between a range of thoroughly par-
tisan narratives? 
In very challenging political and social contexts, such as that found in Iraq, questions 
must be therefore be raised about the limited utility of concepts such as disinformation, 
when what might be unequivocally described as information is itself increasingly hard to 
discern. At the very least, it suggests that we need to think more carefully about what we 
understand by the term disinformation and, by extension, its counterpoint information, 
as well as the criteria we use to distinguish between the two. Even in contexts that seem 
much less challenging than that presented by Iraq, there is arguably a need to think very 
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One of the last pictures taken by Reuters Iraqi 
photographer Namir Noor-Eldeen before he 
was killed on 12 July 2007 shows two old 
women dressed in black walking towards 
a window pierced by a bullet in the al-Amin 
al-Thaniyah neighbourhood of Baghdad. US 
soldiers took Noor-Eldeen’s two digital cameras 
from the scene after he was killed.  
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